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soviétiques juives et non-juives, 1941-1947
Nathalie Moine and John Angell
1 Pictures of villages reduced to ashes, their inhabitants killed or deported, and elderly
survivors seated amid the cinders of their homes and belongings are among the most
common Soviet and post-Soviet representations, both public and private, of the Great
Patriotic War. In the course of the three decades that preceded the collapse of the Soviet
Union, three events significantly helped to activate these public and private memories:
the construction of the memorial complex at Khatyn´, near Minsk, which was inaugurated
in 1969,1 the publication of Ia iz ognennoi derevni by Adamovich in 1975,2 and, Klimov’s “Idi
i smotri,” which won an award at the 1985 Moscow International Film Festival.3
2 It was typical of late Soviet depictions of Nazi campaigns against the civilian population
in occupied territories  to  qualify  this  extreme violence as  genocide.  Mass  killings  of
villagers,  some incinerated dead or  alive,  are  central  to  the  application of the  term
“genocide,” but the fact that entire villages were eradicated is also an important factor.
Soviet representations played a role in shaping Western views of the war on the Eastern
Front, particularly Klimov’s relatively popular movie. Nevertheless, the subject was far
less well-known in the West than it was – and continues to be – in post-Soviet countries.
Soviet and post-Soviet discretion about the mass annihilation of the Jews, on the one
hand, and the use of the term “genocide” to designate the mass destruction of Soviet
villages and their inhabitants, on the other, are crucial to understanding both Western
suspicion and the low importance that has been attributed to this kind of war violence in
Western literature about the Soviet Union.
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3 Germany is an exception, however. Beginning in the 1950s, the events that took place in
the Soviet hinterland have received attention in both literature intended for the general
public and in academic studies, where it has been cast within the framework of the war
on partisans, the famous “Partisanenbekämpfung.” It has been argued that what transpired
was  a  war  against  a  pitiless  and treacherous  enemy,  the  Soviet  partisan,  who led  a
guerrilla campaign against  the German army.  The “dirty war” led in the Belorussian
countryside and elsewhere on Soviet occupied territories was legitimized by the non-
respect of the laws of warfare by Soviet partisans, perceived by the Germans as irregular
fighters.4 This point of view was severely challenged by the “Exhibit on the Crimes of the
Wehrmacht,”  which  launched  a  fierce  debate  in  German  public  opinion  and  among
German historians.5 Atrocities against Soviet villagers featured prominently among the
war  crimes  committed by  the  Wehrmacht  and denounced by the  exhibit’s  curators.6
Echoing Soviet historiography, they claimed that warfare against guerrilla fighters served
in fact only as a pretext for slaughtering as many civilians as possible. Furthermore, they
underscored the unreliability of German sources, with some exceptions, concerning the
fate of civilians, and relied on post-war Soviet sources for descriptions of the unspeakable
treatment  of  Soviet  villagers.  In  this  context,  Christian  Gerlach’s  study  of  occupied
Belorussia offered the most exhaustive depiction to date of German operations against
Belorussian villages. He dismissed the idea that these operations were a mere pretext to
attack  civilians,  depicting  in  some  detail  a  German  strategy  to  cleanse  the  regions
dominated by Soviet partisans that led to the creation of dead zones in 1943. He also
showed, however, that the overwhelming majority of the victims were in fact civilians,
with Soviet partisans representing probably no more than 9% of reported casualties. A
small proportion of these civilians were Jewish, the “war against partisans” providing, in
some cases, a method of cleansing rural areas of the remaining Jewish population.7 He
addressed the atrocious fate of the civilians in detail, including descriptions of human
funeral pyres. It should be noted that most of Gerlach’s evidence on this last point came
from testimony collected during Soviet  post-war  investigations,  including statements
made during the show trial staged by Soviet authorities in Minsk in 1946, as well as from
excerpts from Adamovich’s documentary book Ia iz ognennoi derevni.
4 This paper argues that, from the outset of the German invasion, the pictures of burned
Soviet  villages,  destroyed  along  with  their  inhabitants,  were  central  to  Soviet
representations of German atrocities, even before the Germans implemented the large-
scale  destruction  that  was  at  the  heart  of  their  massive  anti-partisan  operations
beginning in the Spring of 1942. However, burned villages were not merely an instrument
of propaganda with deep roots in collective representations of the traditional horrors of
war. They were also a reality of the Nazi war in the East, which was marked by a policy of
systematic destruction of villages and the killing and deportation of their inhabitants,
part  of  an  unprecedented  campaign  of  violence  against  civilians.  Local  Soviet
investigations  conducted  in  liberated  territories  produced  invaluable  material  that
documented  this  specific  violence  against  Soviet  civilians,  while  also  providing
documentation about mass shootings of Jews. At the end of the war, because they were
involved  in  the international  legal  effort  to  punish  Nazi  crimes,  the  Soviets  were
compelled to apply the concepts of war crimes and crimes against humanity to the mass
killings  of  Soviet  POWs  and  of  civilians  on  the  Soviet  occupied  territories.  Without
concealing  the  ordeal  of  Soviet  Jewish  communities  –  at  least  for  a  short  while
immediately following the war – they opted to focus on the victims of burned villages
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during the Nuremberg trial as well  as the trials staged in parallel in Soviet Union in
1945-46 and again in 1947 by selecting facts and witnesses.
5 During the early months of the invasion, there were few references in Soviet official
publications to killings of Jews, but the German arson of Soviet villages was prominently
featured.8 We still  know very little about the actual information collected by Moscow
regarding the situation in the occupied territories, primarily because of highly limited
access to the relevant archives. Some historians make reference to reports from regional
communist leaders, however, notably Ponomarenko, the first secretary of the Communist
Party of Belorussia, and to numerous reports received and summarized by NKVD Major
Sudoplatov.  These  reports  described,  among  other  subjects,  the  fate  of  the  civilian
population, including the mass killings of Jews beginning within the first few weeks after
the invasion, but we still know little about the actual scope of this information.9 Soviet
leaders knew what was happening to the Jews, but almost nothing was reported in Soviet
newspapers or in the many booklets on German atrocities that were edited for the public,
Soviet propagandists, and Red Army soldiers.
6 As Pravda reported on September 13, 1941,
Sometimes  under  the  threat  of  execution,  sometimes  by bribes  or  by  promises,
German fascist  officers  recruit  agents,  who  are  sent  to  the  rear  with  a  special
mission: to demoralize Soviet territories behind the front with provocative, hostile
rumors saying that Hitlerite hordes do not touch the civil (pacific) population, they
do  not  carry  out  savage  and  monstrous  mass  killings,  they  kill  Jews  and
Communists.10
7 Emphasizing  the  specific  fate  of  the  Jews  was  thus  considered  to  be  deliberately
demoralizing the Soviet population and hence to be collaborating with the enemy. Mass
killings of Jews were sometimes mentioned, notably at Babi Yar, but this information was
far from reflecting the real scale of the slaughter of the Jews. In the case of Babi Iar,
Soviet newspapers claimed there were 52,000 Jewish victims,11 but in Kamenets Podolsk,
the number of Jewish victims was alleged to be 400, since the reports covered killings at
the beginning of August and did not include the unprecedented slaughter at the end of
the  same  month,  when  Jeckeln  reported  23,600  victims.12 In  this  case,  it  is  unclear
whether the mention of the mass killings in Kamenev-Podolsk in early August and the
silence regarding the massacres  at  the end of  the month that  had sixty times more
victims was deliberate or not. On the eve of the August 27-28 massacre, Shcherbakov, the
head of the Sovinformburo, had received an NKVD report that mentioned, among many
similar shootings, that 400 Jewish refugees, mostly women and children from different
regions,  were assembled and executed in Kamenets-Podolsk.13 Obviously,  Shcherbakov
chose – or was allowed – to make this information public in the Sovinformburo statement
of August 30, 1941.14
8 Instead of  covering  the  specific  fate  of  the  Jewish communities  at  the  hands  of  the
German invaders, the literature about mass atrocities sought to demonstrate that the
entire  Soviet  population  was  the  target  of  this  inhuman  German  onslaught.  In  this
context, the subject of villages partly or completely incinerated and their inhabitants
executed  appeared  very  quickly  and  was  completely  consistent  with  the  official
interpretation of the war. The destruction of villages and their inhabitants concerned the
Slavic rural population, which was supposedly the principal target of a Nazi racial war
against the Soviet Union described in speeches and in print ever since the beginning of
the war, including in a speech by Stalin on November 6, 1941.15 The subject was also
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linked to the war’s alleged economic objectives of the war of destroying and plundering
Soviet wealth. The burning of villages meant the destruction of housing as well as goods
not already pilfered by the troops. Very often, it was mentioned that this terrible decision
was taken as a reprisal against villagers who opposed the confiscation of their goods,
cattle, or food:
German punitive detachments burned Zamoshch´e, Zaplius´e, Okliuzh´e and many
other villages in the region of Leningrad to the ground. When burning villages,
fascists drove the peasants out of them, forbidding them categorically to take away
with them even the most essential things.16
9 Depriving the population of food, shelter, and warm clothes was depicted as a barbarous
act that was tantamount to a death sentence, especially in the harsh climatic conditions
of Soviet Union. Numerous pictures captured villagers’ despair as they sat among ashes
and ruins with only stovepipes still standing, among of the most vivid icons of the war.17
10 The violence that accompanied this pillaging included widespread rape of village women
as  well  as  kidnapping for  serving in  German brothels,  as  described in  the  following
Sovinformburo statement from October 8, 1941:
In the former rest home of the Lensovet, in Kamenka, Germans organized a brothel
for officers. Collective farmers of the artel ‘Unity’ received the order to give six
young girls to the brothel. Aware of the fate that awaited them, all the girls hid in
the woods. When they arrived, without warning, in the village, the fascists didn’t
find any women. Then, the Germans took five collective farmers and shot them, and
burned down the village.18
11 The burning of rural homes and the destruction of entire villages were also frequently
associated with the execution of residents or worse, with reported cases of villagers being
burned alive:
Region  of  Smolensk.  A  telephone  line  has  been  spoiled  close  to  the  village  of
Pochinok. The Germans herded old people, women and children from the village
into a building of the collective farm administration and burned all of them alive.19
12 In the following excerpt, the sadistic treament of Jews and non-Jews by Germans was
merged with the same picture of helpless civilians consumed alive by the flames, through
the juxtaposition of two separate events:
In the city of Belostok, the Germans drove more than 300 Jews into the synagogue,
where they detained them for  a  few days,  extorting money and valuables  from
them. The third day, fascists torched the synagogue, together with the Jews who
remained inside. In Gkusskii district, the Germans burned the village of Makovichi
and the villagers,  and all  of  the remaining women and men were driven to the
concentration camp of Slutsk. In this camp a few thousands of prisoners.20
13 The same subtext – Jews and non-Jews are treated alike, with the same incredible sadism
–, or even the substitution of the description of violence against Jews by the violence
against non-Jews, may be read in the following sentence, where the word “pogrom”21 was
used to describe events in a village in the Leningrad region:
In  the  village  of  Peresheek,  Liadskii  district,  region  of  Leningrad,  the  German
occupants organized a wild pogrom. They took from the population all the grain,
cattle,  poultry,  all  the clothing and the housing utensils.  After the plunder,  the
Germans raped a few maids and then torched the entire village.22
14 This  kind of  killing  was  not  limited to  the  civilian rural  population:  pictures  of  the
corpses  of  Red  Army soldiers  who had  been tortured  and burned  also  circulated  in
publications devoted to German atrocities.
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15 Indeed, the burning of villages associated traditional, if widely denounced, war violence
with hitherto unknown cruelty. Soviet readers did not have to look very far in order to
recall the violence of the Civil War, including the destruction of villages. On the other
hand,  an  unprecedented  degree  of  sadism  and  cruelty  was  supposed  to  define  the
singularity  of  the  Nazi  war  against  the  Slavic  population.  Sadism  and  the  absolute
inhumanity  of  the  invaders  were  frequently  emphasized  by  Soviet  witnesses.  One
traditional component of atrocity-related propaganda, the publication of diaries allegedly
found on dead or captured enemy troops, was supposed to confirm this feature of rank
and file German soldiers:
The 25th of August. We throw hand grenades into the houses. Houses quickly ignite.
The fire spreads to the other isbas. A beautiful picture! People cry, and we laugh at
their tears. We have already burned 10 villages this way. The 29th of August. In one
village we captured the first twelve dwellers who were passing by and drove them
to the cemetery. We forced them to dig a wide and deep grave. There is not and
there can’t be any mercy for the Slavs. Damned humanism is foreign to us.23
16 The prominence of the subject of the destruction of villages and the annihilation of their
inhabitants is all the more remarkable because this was not at the time the principal
tactic of the German invaders that it would be later, beginning in the Spring of 1942 after
the Bamberg operation. According to a team of Soviet historians led by Romanovskii that
was  working in  Belorussia,  approximately  3% of  the  villages  burned in  this  republic
during the  war  were  destroyed in  194124.  Still,  even this  relatively  small  percentage
(which should not be taken as definitive, since, as discussed in the conclusion of this
paper, a census is currently being undertaken) tallies with a relevant number of cases,
which was  sufficiently  high to  have influenced Soviet  opinion.  Indeed,  some sources
reported reprisals of this kind during the early months of the war in other areas than
Belorussia,  including  the  newly  occupied  territories  and  particularly  the  region  of
Leningrad.25
17 As reports of the arson of villages increased after early 1942 in Soviet publications about
German atrocities, the texts increasingly took on the form of legal acts, making clear to
the Soviet reader and to the rest of the world that these were war crimes that called for
judicial  punishment.  Indeed,  the concern of  Soviet  authorities with producing legally
admissible documentation led to the creation of the State Extraordinary Commission on
German War Crimes (henceforth ChGK),  which unquestionably increased the mass  of
written documents related to German atrocities, including the arson of Soviet villages.
The political goals underlying the creation of this commission by a decree of November,
1942  (but  which  began  to  actually  function  only  in  the  Spring  of  1943)  and  the
propagandistic aspect of its official statements justify widespread distrust of this Stalinist
institution.26 Still,  the  huge  undertaking  of  collecting  information  and  interviewing
witnesses, opening mass graves, and conducting forensic investigations sheds light on
repression and mass killings against various groups of the Soviet population during the
occupation, including Jewish and non-Jewish civilians. This information is all the more
valuable when one examines locally-gathered material, even if it is unclear what specific
procedures were used in the field at the various levels:  district,  rural soviet,  locality.
Many local mass killings of Jews and non-Jews documented by local commissions under
the aegis of the ChGK are not reflected in any other sources. Second, local material of the
ChGK provides insight into several aspects of the war, notably the specific ways in which
civilians were persecuted and killed during the occupation. This is not to say that no bias
was  introduced  at  the  local  level,  as  is  discussed  below.  Nevertheless,  first-hand
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information is able to provide a far more complete picture than the published statements
of the State Extraordinary Commission could suggest, or even the unpublished reports
written  at  a  higher  level  that  summarized  the  findings  of  local  commissions  and
forwarded up the hierarchy. This has already been demonstrated for the mass killings of
the Jewish population. The abundant material about many sites of mass killings of Soviet
Jews, on very different scales, with frequent references to victims’ nationality, is all the
more striking in that most public Soviet publications were mute concerning such facts.27
18 Indeed, the way in which the results of local investigations were transmitted varied from
place  to  place.  Particularly  as  regards  the  fate  of  the  Jewish  population,  the  ethnic
identity  of  the  victims  was  sometimes  clearly  specified  but  in  other  cases  was  not
reported  separately  from the  number  of  “pacific  Soviet  civilians,”  as  they  would  be
described later in most of the ChGK published statements. These variations suggest that
no clear instructions were given regarding the silence surrounding the slaughter of Jews
in Soviet occupied territories. It seems that the attitude of Soviet authorities, even at the
top level,  was not clearly established during the war years.  This is  illustrated by the
famous censorship of the ChGK report on Kiev in early 1944, when Shvernik, the head of
the ChGK and a true vassal of Stalin, submitted his report on Kiev to Alexandrov, which
started  with  the  words:  “Hitlerite  bandits  committed  a  mass  killing  of  the  Jewish
population,” and described the Jews gathering at the intersection of Melnikovaia and
Dokterevskaia streets. In writing these words, in December, 1943, Shvernik was simply
following the Soviet official line according to which Babi Yar epitomized the German
mass killing of Jews that had been described by Molotov, at length and unambiguously, as
the slaughter of Kievan Jews, in his note of January 6, 1942, which had been sent to Allied
diplomatic representatives and immediately published in Soviet newspapers28. Even the
inflation of the official number of victims did not mean automatically that the Jewishness
of the majority of them should be concealed. As late as January 19, 1944, Kobulov, from
the NKGB, wrote to Shvernik that,  according to initial  estimates,  70 000 Jews, 20 000
Soviet  POWs and 10 000 former members  of  the Party  and the Komsomol  had been
executed  at  Babi  Yar  during  the  occupation.29 Shvernik  clearly  did  not  expect  what
followed, which was the return of his report with significant modifications after it had
been shuttled  back  and  forth,  with  the  involvement  of  such  top  figures  as  Molotov
himself,  Vyshinskii,  or  Shcherbakov.30 From  that  point  onward,  Babi  Yar  lost  its
unambiguous status as a Soviet denunciation of mass annihilation of Jews and became
instead a site for denouncing the mass killings of alternatively either Jews and non-Jews,
as will be discussed below.
19 As has been shown, the burning of villages and the massacre of their inhabitants were
very often discussed in Soviet official publications even before these practices began to be
implemented on a far broader scale. What had been widely publicized because it was for
long a topos of the war atrocity literature that echoed traditional representations of the
violence of war against civilians then took on unprecedented proportions, beginning in
the Spring of 1942 and lasting until the end of the German occupation. This latter phase
also gave rise to vast documentation that was mostly stored within the silence of Soviet
archives.  Indeed,  thousands  of  mostly  handwritten  pages  in  ChGK files  contain  the
testimony of villagers and lists of names of the victims killed in countless locations.
20 Most witnesses were unable to precisely identify the troops who burst into their villages
or hunted down village residents hiding in the woods, let alone recall the names of the
principal perpetrators. In their accounts, operations against the villages were the product
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of  wanton  violence,  even  when  they  referred  to  “punitive  expeditions”  (karatel´nye
ekspeditsii).  The  link  between violence  against  the  local  population  and the  frequent
presence  of  partisans  was  not  established.  The  strategy  of  large  search-and-sweep
operations  that  began with  operation “Bamberg”  in  late  March,  1942  in  the  area  of
Bobruisk-Belostok and their multiplication and intensification throughout 1943, when the
decision was taken to create large “dead zones,” are not at all present in the testimony of
people who had no understanding of what occurred beyond their own village or, at best,
cluster  of  localities.  Only  German  sources  enable  a  general  understanding  of  these
operations, because they present the destruction of villages along with mass plundering,
killings,  and the deportation of village inhabitants within the context of  the broader
German strategy of fighting the partisans. They also reveal the implication of several Nazi
institutions,  including  the  Wehrmacht,  the  SD,  and  the  SS,  in  the  various  stages  of
“Bandenbekämpfung” operations. German sources also reflect the reactions of certain
German dignitaries to the harsh treatment of the Soviet civilian population during this
dirty war, in which they denounced the counter-productive effects of German cruelty
against the rural population, which was so critical to the economy of occupied territories.
31 Such reactions in German records are indicative of the particularly unconventional
treatment of civilians, which these sources do not refer to elsewhere. Reports from Soviet
partisan sources are less  complete than German sources,  but they provide a broader
picture of what was happening than do local witnesses following the liberation of their
districts. However, as opposed to German sources, partisan sources did make the ordeal
of civilians during these operations particularly clear, including the mass killing of people
by burning them alive. Partisan reports were central to informing Moscow about these
operations, which were denounced in the Soviet press, such as the “tragedy of Osveia,”
the Soviet version of the operation Winterzauber32.
21 Documents  collected  by  Soviet  local  commissions,  nevertheless,  provide  a  good
understanding of the fate of civilians, particularly the methods used to slaughter them.
This is significant, since this kind of killing is perhaps what most strongly differentiates
the information available from German and Soviet sources, and, therefore, the Soviet and
post-Soviet narrative on one hand, and the Western (German) narrative on the other.
Local soviet commissions were required to specify both the number of victims and the
method by which they were killed (i.e.,  by shooting,  hanging,  or burning),  gruesome
accounting that was recorded either on pre-printed forms containing categories of ways
of dying or in hand-drawn tables. In the field, the heads of collective farms or of sel´sovet
were responsible for drawing up lists of victims that included their names and how they
died. The accounting on which these lists were based remains unclear, particularly in the
case of mass killings. Clearly, they were most often based on pre-war population lists,
without always verifying that the entire population was present in the village at the time
of the operation.33
22 Frequently, everyone remaining in a village were executed, including both inhabitants
who had not fled or were not serving in the Red Army and people from other villages,
refugees,  or those who had occasionally been assembled by the Germans themselves.
Killing methods varied from location to location. Some victims were shot or gathered in
buildings into which the Germans then tossed grenades. The burning of these buildings
implies that both the corpses and the bodies of the wounded who had survived shootings
or grenade attacks were incinerated together. Executions by gunfire at the edge of pits,
followed by cremation,  are  also  mentioned.34 An additional  approach also  frequently
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appears in local files of the ChGK in which villagers were deliberately burned alive. As
previously mentioned, the description of this kind of mass killing by Western historians is
based on several sources. These include public testimony during Soviet post-war show
trials or taken by the Soviet authorities during pre-trial depositions and later transmitted
to  German  investigators,  mostly  from  Soviet  witnesses  and  occasionally  from  the
defendants themselves. Sources also include witness reports collected by Adamovich in
the 1970s,  in a genre that would be adopted by other Soviet writers.35 Although this
method of killing is very frequently mentioned in the various sources of testimony, it has
continued to be denied or called into question by some German historians in recent
publications.36 For this reason,  it  seems particularly important to take this first-hand
archival material into account in order to shed light on this important but controversial
aspect of the atrocities committed by Germans on Soviet civilians.37
23 The killing of every inhabitant, however, was not always the rule. Some villagers were
deported after  being assembled and taken by  foot  or  other  transportation to  camps
located relatively near the operation zone before being sent to join the labor force within
the Reich or other locations.38 This was the fate of the villagers who survived the anti-
partisan  operations  in  North-western  Belorussia  and  were  deported  to  the  camp  of
Salaspils  in Latvia (Ostland),  for example.39 Although testimony collected on the spot
among surviving villagers does not refer to the destinations of these deportees, ChGK files
contain questionnaires completed by Ostarbeiter who succeeded in returning to their
former places of residence as well as special files devoted to camps located in former
occupied Soviet territories, notably at Salaspils.40
24 Violence against  civilians was also conducted outside of  the villages.  Most  testimony
underscored the fact that people who were taken captive were women, young children,
the  elderly,  and  the  sick.  Indeed,  those  who  had  the  physical  ability  to  escape  the
Germans  and  their  auxiliary  troops  took  refuge  in  the  woods.  Hidden  in  zemlianki,
villagers on the run had to survive hunger and cold. When they were successfully tracked
down by the Germans and their auxiliaries,  escapees suffered the same tragic fate of
either execution or deportation.41
25 The participation of local collaborators in the arson of the villages and the martyrdom of
their  inhabitants  is  occasionally  mentioned.  It  seems  unavoidable  in  the  case  of
expeditions in which a special fate was reserved for the families of partisans.42 On the
whole,  however, the participation of non-Germans is dramatically underplayed in the
Soviet records,43 and the arson of villages by Soviet partisans is naturally completely
obscured.44 The  testimony  of  villagers  most  often  does  not  suggest  any  relationship
between the presence of partisans and the German expedition against their villages. In
fact, another factor is frequently referred to – German retreat. The fact that most of the
exactions described in these testimonials are related to this period of the war, which
continues to be somewhat unfamiliar to the historians, can be explained by the temporal
proximity between these events and witness’s accounts. It could also reflect the sheer
scale of the crimes committed during this distinctive period of the war, which included
the retreat of the Wehrmacht and the civil administration, and was also associated with
pharaonic plans for the evacuation of both material resources and people. These vast
evacuation plans were only partially completed and varied deeply from one location to
another. They nevertheless contributed to lethal mass displacement of the population as
well as mass executions and the burning of villages, often in reprisal against a population
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that was reluctant to leave their homes and belongings for an unknown destination in
order to follow the defeated Wehrmacht.45
26 In  the  Soviet  Union,  the  war  had  been  a  time  of  both  mobilization  and  active
documentation gathering regarding German war crimes.  In order to galvanize public
opinion and legitimize the heavy sacrifices asked of the population, information about
German atrocities was widely disseminated. These two activities, both heavily organized
by  the  Soviet  state,  played  on  a  judicial  treatment  of  the  war  that  was  partially
implemented during the war, notably during the 1943 show trials, but which found its full
expression only after German capitulation.46
27 During the immediate post-war years, the Soviet Union had several opportunities to offer
its version of the war and the Nazi occupation by staging trials both abroad and on Soviet
soil.  This  section  describes  how  Soviet  officials  dealt  with  the  matter  of  qualifying
violence against different population groups. It argues that it was a time during which the
official discourse of the war was under development, a discourse that was not stabilized
before 1947, especially regarding the fate of Soviet Jewish victims. The Soviet Union had
gathered a significant body of evidence concerning crimes committed by the occupying
German forces. Post-war trials were a milestone in the selection of these crimes and in
the way in which they would be ranked hierarchically. They combined Soviet integration
with Allied discourse on the nature of the Nazi experience and a specific Soviet discourse
on the Eastern Front.
28 Soviet participation in the drafting of the London Charter and the four counts of the
indictment  against  defendants  at  the  Nuremberg  International  Military  Tribunal  has
recently been re-assessed, especially concerning the first count of the indictment (Crimes
against Peace) and the charge of complicity, stressing the role of Aaron Trainin, a Soviet
legal  academician,  already  internationally  famous  for  his  work  on  war  crimes  and
member of the Soviet delegation.47 Moreover, Soviet Union actively participated in the
construction  of  a  new concept,  crimes  against  humanity,48 an  addition  to  the  more
traditional concept of war crimes.49 The present section shows how Soviet integration
into  an  international  judicial  process  influenced  Soviet  public  discourse  concerning
civilian victims of the war, which revealed both the Jewish ordeal and that of the other
victims of the occupation, principally the inhabitants of burned villages.
29 For the Western Allies, crimes against humanity included several aspects of Nazi policy,
but this charge clearly targeted above all the mass annihilation of European Jews.50 In his
opening statement, Justice Jackson, Chief Prosecutor for the United States of America,
dedicated an entire section to crimes against the Jews,
the most savage and numerous crimes planned and committed by the Nazis were
those  against  the  Jews.  […]of  the  9,600,000  Jews  who  lived  in  Nazi-dominated
Europe,  60%  are  authoritatively  estimated  to  have  perished.  Five  million  seven
hundred thousand Jews are  missing from the  countries  in  which they formerly
lived, and over 4,500,000 cannot be accounted for by the normal death rate nor by
immigration;  nor  are  they  included  among  displaced  persons.  History  does  not
record a crime ever perpetrated against so many victims or one ever carried out
with such calculated cruelty.51
30 Moreover, Jackson claimed that the worst treatment had been unquestionably reserved
for Eastern European Jews:
As the German frontiers were expanded by war, so the campaign against the Jews
expanded. The Nazi plan never was limited to extermination in Germany; always it
contemplated extinguishing the Jew in Europe and often in the world. In the West,
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the Jews were killed and their property taken over. But the campaign achieved its
zenith of savagery in the East. The eastern Jews have suffered as no people ever
suffered.52
31 Even if  the  Allies  were  not  aware  of  the  full  scope of  the  Holocaust  at  the  time of
Nuremberg,53 the trial was the first opportunity to document and to give a comprehensive
definition to the fate of European Jews, including those in the Soviet Union. Although the
complete set of Einsatzgruppen reports had not yet been discovered,54 some of them were
already  in  circulation  and  were  quoted  by  both  American  and  Soviet  prosecutors.55
Among the mass killings of Jews reported by German sources that were cited by Jackson,
Babi Yar, with its 33,771 victims, was by far the deadliest, although this figure was quite
inferior  to Soviet  estimates,  as  will  be discussed below.56 Otto Ohlendorf,  the former
leader of Einsatzgruppe D, who explained how his unit killed more than 90,000 Soviet
Jews, including men, women, and children, between June, 1941 and June, 1942, had been
summoned by  the  American  Public  Ministry,  and  his  deposition  constituted  another
important  moment  in  the  description  of  Jewish  slaughter  in  the  occupied  Soviet
territories.57
32 The Soviet prosecution unquestionably contributed to revelations about the Jewish fate at
Nuremberg, but it had certain particularities. On several occasions, the Soviets cited the
same statistics used by the Western Allies concerning the annihilation of European Jewry
on the whole, but they never offered precise figures about the number of Soviet Jewish
victims, with some exceptions for the Baltics. Nuremberg also was an important moment
in the universalization of the identity of the victims of Babi Yar by the Soviets, and the
Soviet definition of Nazi crimes against humanity definitely included victims other than
Jews.
33 General Rudenko’s opening statement began with a long treatise on Nazi racial theory as
the key to understanding their vision of the world. He left out any mention to the place of
the Jews in this theory, but he did utter this well-known, eloquent statement about Nazi
occupation policy:
The  population  of  these  countries,  and  of  Slav  countries  above  all others  –
especially  Russians,  Ukrainians,  Byelorussians,  Poles,  Czechs,  Serbians,  Slovenes,
Jews – were subjected to merciless persecution and mass extermination.58
34 His speech left no uncertainty, however, about the actual fate of Soviet Jews in terms of
their extermination:
The bestial  annihilation  of  the  Jewish  population  took  place  in  the  Ukraine,  in
Byelorussia [sic], and in the Baltic States. In the town of Riga some 80,000 Jews lived
before the German occupation. At the moment of the liberation of Riga by the Red
Army, there were 140 Jews left there.59
35 Several months later, in his closing statement on July 29, 1946, Rudenko, speaking of
Kaltenbrunner, described again the activities of the four Einsatzgruppen, including the
massacre  at  Babi  Yar,  as  “an  execution  unmatched  in  cruelty,  when  100,000  Soviet
citizens perished on a single day.”60 In this entire section of his presentation that related
to the Einsatzgruppen, in which,  in addition to Babi Yar,  he mentioned several  mass
killings known to have involved Jews, Rudenko did not a single time refer to the fact that
the victims he was discussing were Jewish. In fact,  victims’ fates were merged into a
collective, sadistic method of murdering both Jews and non-Jews:
And when Kaltenbrunner’s fate will be decided, all the victims asphyxiated in the
‘murder vans’ near Stavropol, buried alive in the graves near Kiev and Riga, burned
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alive in the Byelorussian [sic] villages, must never be forgotten. All these innocent
victims are on his unclean conscience.61
36 Later in the speech, Rudenko offered a surprisingly blurred version of events:
And all  of  the  operations  “Cottbus”  for  the  extermination of  Jews in  the  Baltic
towns,  in  the  Ukraine  and  Byelorussia  [sic]  –  all  these  were  carried  out  in
conformity with Rosenberg’s theories and with his agreement.”62
37 Nevertheless, in his statement concerning Streicher’s guilt, he mentioned that “over six
million European Jews” had been slaughtered.63 Instead of being denied by the Soviet
team, the mass annihilation of Jews in Europe and the Soviet Union was thus re-framed
within a narrative of which it was not the most significant element, despite the fact that
its vast scale was clearly mentioned or, in the case of the Soviet Union, at least strongly
suggested; the deaths of Jews were thus in effect permanently envisioned as being in
competition with other victims.
38 The Soviet team organized the presentation of evidence according to the four counts in
the indictment, but when it came to the charge of war crimes, different aspects of the
charge were addressed by different members of the Soviet team, notably the treatment of
prisoners  of  war,  forced labor,  and deportation into “German slavery.”  The arson of
villages  and  their  “wanton”  destruction  were  described  several  times,  first  by  L.N.
Smirnov, Chief counselor of Justice, who was the Assistant Prosecutor for the USSR, in his
presentation on “crimes against the peaceful population,” but also by General Sheinin
during his presentation on “the plunder of private, public,  and state property,”64 and
later by Raginsky, State Counsellor of Justice of the Second Class, in terms of the “wanton
destruction and annihilation of towns and villages.” It was Raginsky who emphasized the
planned creation of dead zones.65 He described the fate of the Latvian village of Audrini,
which had been destroyed in January, 1942 along with its entire population,66 and the
burning of villages in the Leningrad region in February, 1944, according to the verdict of
the Leningrad trial.67 But he also described the fate of villages in other occupied countries
and inserted the projection of images of the destruction of Lidice that had been filmed by
the Germans, before showing a second documentary film devoted to the destruction of
Soviet  localities  perpetrated by the Germans in the Soviet  territories.68 However,  the
witness called in this section by Raginsky was Joseph Abgarovitch Orbeli, the director of
the State  Hermitage Museum,  who presented himself  as  an international  expert  and
testified about the destruction of the monuments of culture and art in Leningrad.69 The
fact  that  no  witness  from  a  burned  village  was  called  in  this  section  on  material
destruction, despite the quantitative and qualitative importance of these actions, does
not mean that this kind of crimes was downplayed at Nuremberg. Quite the contrary, the
burning  of  villages  received  the  highest  publicity  in  the  section  on  “Crimes  against
Humanity” presented by Smirnov on February 25 and 26, 1946.
39 An entire section of Smirnov’s statement was devoted to the persecution of the Jews,
including  in  the  occupied  Soviet  Union,  but  this  section  was  preceded  by  the  vivid
evocation  of  the  tragedy  of  the  burned  villages,  through  the  testimony  of  the  first
ordinary Soviet witness.
In order to explain the methods adopted by the German fascists in the execution of
their  cannibalistic  plan  for  the  extermination  of  the  Soviet  people  –  peaceful
citizens of my motherland, women, children, and old people – I request the tribunal
to  call  and  question  witness  Grigoriev,  Jacob  Grigorievitch,  a  peasant  from  the
village  of  Pavlov,  village  soviet  of  Shkvertovsk,  region  of  Pokhovsk,  district  of
Pskov.70
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40 Grigoriev explained that he and one of his sons were the sole survivors of his family to
escape. Every other family member had been killed during the operation, including his
nine year-old son, who was burned alive, as were most of the remaining inhabitants of
the village. Grigoriev further explained how the burning of his village was not an isolated
incident and that several other villages and their inhabitants had suffered a similar fate.
He made the point that there was no partisan activity whatsoever in his village:
nobody indulged in any partisan activities since there was nobody left.  Only old
people and small children were left in the village; the village had never seen any
partisans and did not know who these partisans were.71
41 The fate of  Soviet  POWs was then addressed during Smirnov’s presentation when he
called the third Soviet witness, Doctor Eugene (sic) Alexandrovich Kivelisha.72
42 Jewish  mass  killings  came later  in  Smirnov’s  demonstration.  Like  the  Americans,  he
produced a report from the Einsatzgruppe A (URSS-57) that had been found by the Red
Army  in  Gestapo  archives  in  Latvia  and  that  described  other  mass  killings  (Pinsk,
Kislovodsk, Stavropol´). Further, he claimed that 3 million Jews had perished in Poland,
quoting a report of the Polish Government, while providing no similar total figures for
the occupied Soviet territories. He summoned his fourth witness on the following day,
Abram Gerzevitch Sutzkever, a Jewish writer who had been in the Vilnius ghetto between
June, 1941 and September, 1943. Sutzkever had close ties to influential members of the
Soviet Jewish intelligentsia, and his testimony was certainly arranged by Ehrenburg and
Mikhoels.73 In the same year that he testified at Nuremberg, his written testimony about
the fate of the Vilnius ghetto was published in Moscow, in yiddish.74 Actually, Sutzkever, a
Yiddish writer, had dreamt to testify in this language75. Because he was originally from
recently annexed territories – and despite being born a subject of the Russian empire76 –
he had been a Soviet citizen for only a short time, and it was certainly not by chance that
the president of the court asked him: “Are you a Soviet citizen?” To which Sutzkever
replied:  “Yes.”77 Smirnov  underscored  several  points  made  by  Sutzkever  during  his
testimony, including the fact that there were 80,000 Jewish inhabitants in Vilnius prior to
the occupation, of whom 79,400 were exterminated; this was the last sentence of the
questioning. No mention was made of Sutzkever’s participation in the partisan movement
and  the  rescue  of  priceless  Jewish  archives.  Two  additional  Jewish  witnesses  were
questioned  by  Smirnov:  the  Polish  citizens  Severina  Shmaglevskaya  concerning
Auschwitz,  and Samuel Rajzman, who had been deported from the Warsaw ghetto to
Treblinka.
43 Consistent with Rudenko’s February 8, 1946 speech, witnesses testified specifically on the
mass killing of Jews. However, among these three Jewish witnesses, only the poet Abram
Sutskever was the only one to specifically refer to mass killings of Jews in the former
occupied Soviet territories. The two other Jewish witnesses summoned by the Soviets at
the Nuremberg trial did not come from the Soviet Union and testified about Polish camps
– Auschwitz and Treblinka — that had been liberated by the Red Army, thus illustrating
the narrative used by the Soviets at Nuremberg regarding the Jewish ordeal, which was
consistent with the general indictment alleging an exceptional effort to destroy European
Jewry.  This  had  the  effect  of  underlining  the  overall  scale  of  the  events  while  also
minimizing the enormity of  the Jewish losses that  took place within occupied Soviet
territories.
44 The  final  part  of  Smirnov’s  presentation  about  crimes  against  humanity  concerned
religious  persecution.  He  summoned  the  Archdean  of  the  churches  of  the  City  of
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Leningrad, the Very Reverend Nikolai Ivanovich Lomakin, whose testimony provided a
gruesome portrait of Leningrad under the siege.78
45 Witnesses were not intented to play an important role at the Nuremberg trial because
written evidence was given greater weight. Furthermore, witnesses summoned by the
prosecution,  especially  the  Soviets,  clearly  did  not  have  the  same  status  as  other
witnesses. Although they obviously had an emotional impact on the Western audience,
some doubt surrounded the veracity of their accounts.79
46 Nevertheless, the choice of witnesses had been thoroughly prepared by the Soviets, since
Fall 1945. It’s not easy to follow from the beginning to the end how they were selected,
but the documentation available in former Soviet archive suggest both conflicting views
inside  Soviet  leadership  and  a  constant  evolution,  from the  first  drafts  to  the  very
audience at Nuremberg. Several lists of possible witnesses circulated, reflecting different
understandings of the relative weight that should be given to different aspects of the
martyrdom of the Soviet population.
47 Preparation for the Nuremberg trial was assigned both to an official commission and to
the secret Politburo commission headed by Vyshinskii. At the meeting of November 9,
1945, a short list of Soviet witnesses was to ratify, but it was also decided to expand the
list of potential witnesses. A subcommittee was specially in charge of selecting witnesses
who should testify at Nuremberg, although Soviet leadership didn’t know how far they
would have the possibility to summon them at the public audience, and in that case how
many.80 Several  institutions took part  in the selection process by drawing up lists  of
witnesses. The subcommittee had at its disposal several lists sent by the ChGK, the NKVD,
the Red Army.81 Obviously, the Jewish Antifascist committee played also a prominent role,
possibly at a later stage.82
48 The short list mentioned above, “ratified by the Vyshinskii commission,”83 included 19
names,  only  one of  whom,  V.Iu.  Davydov,  was  described as  Jewish84.  The individuals
appearing  on  the  list  were  primarily  high-profile  experts  or  public  figures  who
participated  in  the  largest  ChGK  inquiries,  the  rank-and-file  witnesses  being  only  a
minority.85 The sites of certain well-known Jewish mass killings were included in the
inquiries,  from  Auschwitz  to  L´vov,  but  the  fact  that  the  individuals  nominated  as
witnesses were not Jewish makes it highly probable that the objective was to universalize
the victims. In one emblematic example, a Polish priest named Savitskii, ksendz in Rovno,
was the only witness listed for a site in which several thousand Jews had been killed.
Certain other elements, such as the destruction of spiritual and artistic patrimony, were
introduced, particularly by figures such as M. Dmitriev, head of the Department devoted
to Ancient Russia Art at the Russian Museum of Leningrad, I.A. Orbeli, Academician, vice-
head of the Soviet Academy of Sciences, who participated in the inquiries on suburbs
estates in Leningrad, and I.A. Gruzdev, a member of the leadership of the Soviet Writers
Union,  who took part  in the ChGK investigations  of  famous Russian historical  cities,
including Novgorod and Pskov. Then, an undated draft, probably the new extended list,
included the names of 35 possible witnesses selected by the ChGK, with their whereabouts
and a brief description of the events or facts about which they could testify.86 Six were
explicitly mentioned as Jews, including four witnesses of Babi Yar.87 Nine witnesses on the
list  could  testify  about  the  ordeal  of  the  Soviet  POWs.  The  following  hand-written
notation appears in the margin of the list: “arson of villages and cities,” as though the
reader was referring to a particular topic that was missing from the document.
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49 By contrast with the two earlier lists, a third draft explicitly mentioned the destruction of
villages in a section devoted to this kind of crime.88 Five witnesses had been selected for
this section: Iakov Grigor´evich Grigor´ev, head of a collective farm in the Pskov oblast´,
Vasilii Pavlovich Pavlov, also the head of a collective farm in the region of Pskov, Vasilii
Sergeevich  Sergeev,  villager  of  the  region  of  Pskov,  Nadezhda  Nikolaevna  Ostreiko,
kolkhoznitsa of the Minsk region, and Sof´ia Vasil´evna Sikritskaia, a villager in the same
region.  Some of  these figures were direct  survivors of  the atrocities,  and each could
testify about the destruction of the villages and the killing of their inhabitants, some of
whom were burned alive. Nevertheless, while the topic of the burned villages clearly lay
behind the composition of this third list, it was far from the most prominent emphasis.
The  first section  was  devoted  to  “murder  and  brutal  behaviour  against  the  civilian
population” and counted 14 witnesses, six of whom were identified as Jewish. The second
largest section was devoted to “murder and brutal behaviour against Soviet POWs,” with
11 witnesses, followed by a section on deportation and forced labor (six witnesses). The
murder of children was treated in a separate section that included four witnesses.
50 What happened between December, 1945 and February 18, 1946, when Soviet witnesses of
German atrocities fled from Vnukovo airdrome to Germany, remains unclear. According
to the most famous of them, Avrom Sutzkever, nine witnesses were selected to be seated
in  the  plane.  In  addition  to  Sutzkever  himself,  four  witnesses  actually  testified  at
Nuremberg: Iossif Abramovich Orbeli, Nikolai Ivanovich Lomakin, Evgenii Kivilska, Iakov
Grigor´ev.  The  others  who  had  been  selected  but  were  not  allowed  to  speak  were
Professor Dmitriev from Leningrad, two Belorussian girls, former inmates of Auschwitz
and Maidanek, Tarkovskii,  former POW of the military hospital  at Slavuta,  and David
Iossifovich Budnik, a Kievan Jew. The former was already a bit of celebrity by 1946. He
was one of the few escapees of the commando that had taken part in the incineration of
the  corpses  at  Babi  Yar  in  1943  and  had  succeeded  in  escaping  the  German  death
sentence, the usual fate for those who had been selected among the Syrets camp inmates
for this task. Budnik, as Berliant, Davydov, Brodskii and Steiuk, had been interrogated
several times by Soviet authorities since the liberation of Kiev and, as mentioned above,
had been selected to testify at Nuremberg in various drafts. Davydov had been especially
honored to tell their story to Khrushchev, few days after the liberation of the city, and to
show him all the sites where German atrocities took place in Kiev.89 The final selection of
Budnik in Moscow can be explained by several  factors:  selected witnesses  had to be
located  and  screened  by Soviet  authorities.90 The  result  of  this  selection  was
unpredictable, as Sutzkever’s diary suggests.91 Nevertheless, the ability of the witnesses to
speak according to the Soviet prosecution was certainly central, and in any case, each
detail of their speech was already prepared in Moscow.92 However, once at Nuremberg,
witnesses could still have been eliminated. Sutzkever, again, relates in his diary that he
waited  for  days,  not  knowing  whether  he  would  be  called  to  testify  (and  in  which
language). The reasons for this uncertainty are not clear: obviously a lack of time for the
Soviet prosecution but also, perhaps, some reluctance either from the Soviet delegation
or the General Procuracy.93 That Soviet prosecution was ready to summon an important
witness from Kiev, a Jew who would certainly testify about Operation 1005 in Babi Yar in
1943, which is, undirectly, on all the Soviet victims lying under the ground of Babi Yar
ravine, rather than on the mass killing of Kievan Jews at the end of September, 1941 is an
important  fact,  that  confirms the  centrality  of  this  topic  for  the  Soviets,  which was
already noticeable in the earlier draft lists of witnesses mentioned earlier. And the fact
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that, although he was in the corridors of the Nuremberg Tribunal, Sutzkever was the only
one to testify concerning the ordeal of Soviet Jews constitutes a choice that demands
further investigation. Sutzkever’s oratory skills might represent a preliminary answer.
51 Clearly, Soviet authorities had screened Jewish and non-Jewish witnesses on Babi Yar, but
ultimately, no Soviet witnesses were summoned to give testimony about it or any other
site at which mass killings of Jews took place within the pre-1939 Soviet borders, even
though Babi Yar had been featured by Soviet newspapers during the war and even though
it was mentioned by the Soviet prosecution during the trial, with Rudenko ambiguously
stressing the number of victims without specifically using the word Jews (100,000 Soviet
citizens instead of 52,000 mentioned in a previous assessment). The massacre had also
been made public during the January, 1946 Kiev trial (see below), not to mention through
the publication of poems by Jewish writers up until the year 1947.94
52 A  new  public  Soviet  discourse  on  war  crimes  and  crimes  against  humanity  also
predominated inside Soviet Union in the wake of the war. The staging of public trials
against foreign, mostly German, POWs, both in tandem with the Nuremberg trial and
again  at  the  end  of  1947,  provided  a  new  opportunity  to  advertise  the  atrocities
committed  on  occupied Soviet  territories.95 As  might  be  expected,  these  trials  were
completely controlled by the Kremlin,  which gave them top priority.  Eighteen public
trials against war criminals were held in the Soviet Union between late 1943 and late 1947
concerning 224 POWs. The widely publicized Kharkov trial constituted the first major
attempt by the Soviets to implement the Allied declaration according to which second-
order war criminals should be tried in the countries where they had committed war
crimes. However, further trials of this kind were not held in the Soviet Union before the
end of the war. An initial wave of post-war show trials was organized between December,
1945 and February, 1946 in Smolensk, Briansk, Nikolaev, Kiev, Minsk, Riga, Velikie Luki,
and  Leningrad,  a  second wave  was  held  in  Stalino,  Bobruisk,  Sebastopol,  Chernigov,
Poltava, Vitebsk, Kishinev, Novgorod, and Gomel during the Fall of 1947. In both cases,
secret  committees  were  appointed  to  select  the  indicted  POWs,  judges,  prosecutors,
lawyers, and witnesses and to coordinate and approve the prosecution’s strategies and
each trial’s final verdict. Advertised by the press, these trials were also the subject of a
number of publications96 and showed evidence of being driven by a clear overall politico-
educational objective.
53 The  staging  of  the  public  for  this  trial  is  particularly  striking  in  comparison  with
Nuremberg.  The  public  was  clearly  supposed  to  represent  Soviet  society,  including
priests.97 Public reactions are regularly mentioned in published reports of the trials, such
as the wave of applause when the sentences were read and the fact that several thousand
people observed the public hanging of most of the defendants. Press and radio coverage
as well as meetings in factories, universities, and in the countryside allowed stories of the
atrocities to spread far beyond the people attending the actual trial and demonstrated
the  severe  treatment  of  war  criminals  by  the  Soviet  state,  backed  by  formal  legal
proceedings.
54 Soviet post-war show trials were used by the authorities as a tool for redefining crimes
committed on its soil that the Soviet government wished to expose. This qualification of
the crimes was  explicitly  based on the indictment  counts  drawn up by the Allies  in
preparation for Nuremberg. As a consequence, the particular fate of Soviet Jews appears
clearly in the show trials of 1945-46, in obvious contrast with the quasi-silence during the
war-time trials, which were marked by a tendency to universalize the identity of Soviet
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victims.98 The  killing,  deportation,  and  plundering  of  the  non-Jewish  population
nevertheless played a far more central role. The policy of burning thousands of Soviet
villages to the ground thus received even more extensive coverage than during the 1943
trials.
55 The show trial in Leningrad between December 28, 1945 and January 4, 1946 exemplifies
this new-found centrality of the subject of the arson of villages. In fact, the policy of
incinerating villages was characterized as part of a policy of total destruction that was
not limited to rural areas. The indictment read that “the Leningrad region was placed in
the  category  of  regions  which  had  to  be  erased.”  In  addition  to  the  3,153  villages
destroyed by the Germans,  the indictment also drew attention to urban devastation,
particularly  of  the  cultural  heritage  of  Novgorod and Pskov  and the  palaces  on  the
outskirts  of  Leningrad,  including  Gatchina,  Pavlovsk,  Pushkin,  and  Peterhof.  The
denunciation of  the violence perpetrated against  civilians through the destruction of
their villages played a vastly more important role than during the Nuremburg trials, as
well as the facts that were related primarily to the end of the occupation.99 This explosion
of violence at the end of the war was linked to the particular conditions of the German
army’s retreat. One of the primary defendants, Remlinger, the military commander of
Pskov from September, 1943 to February, 1944, was said to have confessed that
in accordance with group “Nord” general staff of November, 1943, the retreating
German army had to evacuate, on the territory situated between the front lines and
the line going through the cities of Narva-Pskov-Ostrov and further to the south, all
the  population,  except  for  the  ill  and  those  unable  to  be  transported,  in  the
direction of Riga. All villages, towns, cities were to be set on fire and subjected to
explosive devices. I, Remlinger, have received from the general staff “Nord” all of
the orders mentioning the evacuation and the destruction of localities and I have
communicated these orders to the local kommendanturen to be carried out.100
56 The martyrdom of civilians in the Leningrad region was exemplified by the mass killing in
the village of  Pikalikha,  on February 27,  1944,  which was widely  described in Soviet
newspapers covering the Leningrad trial.
On  the  order  of  Remlinger,  the  German  officer  of  the  Feldkomandantur  in  the
territory  of  the  Karamyshevskii  district,  Gruns,  and  the  chief  of  the
Feldgendarmerie, Max, when the Red Army was going closer, set villages on fire and
deported by force the population to fascist hard labor (katorga) in Germany. On
February  27,  1944,  Soviet  citizens  who refused  to  go  to  Germany – 180  people,
exclusively elderly people, women, and children – were gathered in the houses of
the village of Pikhalia and burned. Those who tried to escape through the windows
were shot.101
57 The mass killing in Pikhalia was just one among the many examples mentioned during
the  trial.  There  were  a  number  of  indications  that  this  practice  was  widespread,
particularly the total number of villages destroyed and of villagers killed and deported
for  the  region as  a  whole,  or  for  certain districts.  The testimonies  of  survivors  also
provided many examples, further reinforced by the sheer scale of destruction that each
defendant  hah  had  inflicted.  For  instance,  one  defendant  claimed  that  he  had  been
personally involved in the arson of more than twenty villages in the region of Leningrad.
102 However, the German scorched-earth policy in advance of the Soviet attack was not
the only explanation for the violence described during the trial.  The war against the
partisans  had  been  conducted  up  until  the  actual  final  German  withdrawal.  As  a
consequence, the combination of the policy of destruction in the partisan areas and the
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evacuation  and  scorched-earth  policies  produced  an  orgy  of  violence  against  Soviet
villagers in the final months of the occupation.
58 Another defendant whose name was given as Ianike had supposedly mentioned in his
confession an order from Remlinger from December, 1943
which ordered the torching of every locality in the area in which Soviet partisans
operated,  the  deportation  of  the  entire  able-bodied  population  to  behind  the
German army and the shooting of all others.
59 Nevertheless, describing his participation in carrying out the order, Ianike did not talk
about fighting the partisans themselves, only about random violence against civilians:
There we encircled a village, the name of which I don’t remember, we torched all
the buildings and shot all the population, more or less 200-250 people. I personally
shot, more or less, 30-35 people.103
60 The prevalence of the topic of burning villages is all the more striking in the cases of
show trials held in areas where the pre-war Jewish population had been annihilated. As
mentioned earlier,  the  genocide  against  the  Jews  was  explicitly  denounced in  Soviet
publications  connected  to  both  Nuremberg  and  Soviet  public  trials.  However,  the
evocation of the mass killings of Jews did not follow exactly the same pattern in every city
in which major show trials took place. In the Minsk trial, the proportion of Jewish victims
among the civilians killed in Belorussia during the occupation was never mentioned,
although the numerous examples of mass killings that did explicitly concerned Jews that
were evoked during the proceedings listed dizzying numbers of victims (although the
mass killings that were mentioned were far from representing the total number, and
many figures were inaccurate). The Nazis’ desire to exterminate all of the Jews was never
mentioned, by contrast with the Riga trial. In his final speech at Riga, prosecutor Zav
´ialov, referring to the Nazi occupation in the Baltic area, claimed that “Jewish population
has been totally exterminated.”104 The interrogation of defendant Hess at the Minsk trial
is typical of this half-confessed (on the part of the Soviets) truth. The public attorney
asked him:
You went from one locality to another. Why? Did you have a special task, to go from
city to another and destroy the Jewish population? [Hess replied:] Yes, we had the
task to destroy all the Jewish population in the region of Vileika.105
61 Every aspect of the persecution and the extermination of Jews were addressed both by
the defendants and the Soviet witnesses, a minority of whom were Jewish survivors. The
extermination  of  other  minorities  was  also  very  clearly  mentioned,  including  the
extermination of all of the Gypsies in the Baltic region, which was proclaimed several
times at the Riga trial106 and was also mentioned, although only briefly, at the Minsk trial.
107
62 The mass killing of Jews was explicitly and extensively covered during the public trial in
Kiev in January, 1946. Several defendants were accused of participating in them, some of
whom explained that they were not guilty while not denying that the slaughter had taken
place early in the occupation, i.e., before they were assigned to the Soviet Union. One
participant,  however,  an  SS  officer  named  Isenman,  explained  in  some  detail  the
involvement of his division, “Viking,” in the extermination of the Jewish population in
Berdichev, L´vov, and Tarashchi. Because of the Soviet prosecutor’s insistence, the mass
killing of Jews was described in great detail, particularly in the case of the defendant
Drachenfels, who arrived in Rovno in October, 1942 and who helped execute 25,000 Jews
in a small forest 9 kilometers east of Rovno.108 However, the mass killing of the Kievan
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Jews at Babi Yar predominated, especially among the depositions of witnesses. The most
wellknown witness was Dina Pronicheva, a survivor of the massacre who recounted a long
story about what she had seen and experienced that made it abundantly clear that the
victims  had  been  Jewish.109 The  cremation  of  bodies  (Operation  1005)  was  vividly
described  by  another  witness,  Berliant,  we  already  met  as  a  possible  witness  for
Nuremberg trial110. Along with Pronicheva, he was quoted in the final indictment by the
prosecutor.111
63 The ordeal of Soviet villagers nevertheless played a more central role in descriptions of
Nazi exterminatory policies in occupied Soviet territory, a specific policy that was linked
both to the German past and to the Nazi Weltanschauung. The prosecutor at the Riga show
trial tied this practice explicitly to the past history of the area, which had previously been
ruled by the Teutonic knights, and quoted a chronicle: “they committed villages to flames
– houses were torched like straw. They killed most of the men and took the women and
children prisoner.”112 The same prosecutor also established the connection with the
considerably more recent past, quoting one of the defendants who spoke of the creation
of “dead zones” during the withdrawal from the Moscow region at the end of 1941:
I  could  understand  the  very  term  of  “dead  zone,”  and  I  didn’t  need  further
deciphering by some instruction. I’m a WWI veteran, and when the German army
withdrew from the region of Lille, we also made “dead zones” there that were 15-16
kilometers wide, destroying and torching every locality within the zone.
64 On the other hand, the prosecutor emphasized that the violence inflicted by Nazis on
civilians, particularly children, was on a scale that was beyond any past experience.113 The
past of another defendant named Küpper was also referred to during testimony. Küpper
had been involved in  the  pillaging of  “Soviet  Ukraine” in  1918 and again in  similar
operations in Ukrainian villages during which hundreds of  localities were torched in
1942,  before  later  participating  in  large-scale  anti-partisan  operations  as  the
Feldkomendant of Daugavpils.114
65 The integration of the anti-partisan campaign within a broader genocidal (although this
term was not yet used in the Soviet Union of 1946) plan against the Slavic (i.e., Russian)
population  was  clearly  emphasized  during  the  Minsk  trial.  This  assertion  extended
beyond repeated demonstrations during the trials that almost all of the victims of the
operation were civilians. The following dialogue between the Soviet prosecutor and the
German defendant Herf at the Minsk trial emphasized this point:
During the opening of the trial, you made the statement that Kube had told you in
detail how Himmler had given the order to the chief of the general staff for the
fighting against partisans, Bach, to destroy in occupied Soviet territories 20 million
Russians, and that this should considerably diminish the activity of the partisan
movement. Is this true?
Herf answered: Himmler gave the order to Bach to destroy 20 million Russians, and
Bach himself said that it was unavoidable to destroy not 20 million, but more, 30
million people.
The  prosecutor:  What  was  the  goal  of  such  massive  destruction  of  the  Soviet
population?
Herf: From 1943 on, Himmler stated that Urals should belong to the Germans and
that, to the West of Urals, we had to ensure that no Russian would remain.115
66 This colonial obsession was repeatedly referred to during the Kiev trial as an explanation
for the Nazi determination to kill as many people as possible.116
67 However, the struggle against the partisan movement as a pretext for destroying the
Slavic population was not an argument limited to the Soviet audience. It had already been
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underscored a few days before at the Nuremberg trial, during the testimony of Bach-
Zelewski, and had already been developped by Rafaël Lemkin in his Axis Rule in Occupied
Europe, edited in 1944.117
68 ChGK actions were heavily cited during each of these trials to support the indictments,
which alleged a variety of crimes. The defendants’ confessions both before and during the
hearings played a key role in establishing their guilt, however, because descriptions of
ChGK  acts  lacked  precise  evidence  and  did  not identify  participants  in  the  killings.
Confessions were extracted using a variety of methods in these completely orchestrated
trials.118 In describing his involvement in the plan to convert the left bank of Dniepr in a
desert zone (zona pustiny)  by the “SS Death’s Head Division” during his deposition of
November 2, 1947, which was quoted in the Poltava trial, Bekker, allegedly, declared:
The localities through which the SS Division retreated provided an extraordinary
picture of savage destruction. Arson everywhere. The picture of these crimes was so
monstrous that one could believe that the whole earth was burning.119
69 This quote was particularly unlikely coming from a defendant, but it definitely provided a
perfect example of the vivid picture of the war that the Soviets sought to publicize.
 
Conclusion
70 Following the strategy of dissimulation and concealment about the Great Patriotic War
that characterizes late Stalinism, a renewed quest for memory of the war was cultivated
by post-1953 Soviet leaders. This movement to resuscitate memories of the war found
particularly powerful expression in the construction of memorials.
71 The setting of the Khatyn memorial made it abundantly clear that it was intended to
provide an example of the hundreds (or thousands) of other, similar cases. Indeed, the
representation of these many other villages is a distinct feature of this memorial site,
which still occupies a central place in post-Soviet Belorussian national consciousness.120
By contrast, Babi Yar represents the impossible memorialization of the mass killings of
Jews.  Even when Soviet  leaders eventually decided to erect a monument to Babi  Yar
victims in 1976 on a site that had become nearly unrecognizable since the war, the Jewish
identity of most of the victims was concealed, even though it had become an informal
gathering place for Jewish Soviet citizens ever since the end of the war. Now that the
Jewish  identity  of  the  victims  is  officially  recognized,  and  despite  the  ongoing
competition between several memorials to various groups of victims, the enormity of the
mass killings on September 29-30, 1941 has the effect of masking the fact that, no matter
how monstrous Babi Yar was, it involved only a small fraction of the 1,5 million Jews who
died during the war inside Ukraine’s present-day borders.121
72 In this context, the Povyshenie statusa spasshikhsia zhitelei sozhzhennykh belorusskikh dereven´
[Elevating the status of the escapees from Belorussian burned villages] project is striking
given the already overwhelming presence of the subject in the Belorussian landscape.
Indeed,  Khatyn  is  the  best-known  and  most  visited  Belorussian  memorial,  and  the
Belorussian countryside is dotted with other local memorials of various sizes, shapes, and
ages. However, the launching of this project is symptomatic of the enduring anxiety of
being forgotten. It can be explained by the prevailing idea that the list of burned villages
remains incomplete.  However,  this  movement to memorialize above all  reflects  post-
Soviet frustration with Western memory of the war in the East. Since the end of the 1980s
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in Belorussia, like in other post-Soviet countries, foreign and local Jewish associations
have begun to fund memorials in areas in which Jews had been exterminated. The fact
that the new Belorussian project seeking recognition of the status of the survivors of
burned villages is supported by a German foundation (“Erinnerung, Verantwortung und
Zukunft”) also involved in making reparations to Nazi victims in Eastern Europe confirms
the idea of an underlying competition between Jewish and non-Jewish victims.122 It also
underscores a shared desire for recognition – as well as some form of compensation –
from the West,  through designation as “victims of Nazism.” Again, archival evidence,
primarily from the ChGK, is referenced by the NARB, the Belorussian national archives, as
part of a move to create an electronic data-base that includes village names, data on the
destruction of farms and killings among the population, and other significant dates and
archival resources.123
73 Clearly, the urge for a shared history of the Nazi occupation that would yield a narrative
embracing  every  victim  represents  the  only  means  of  gaining  recognition  of  these
atrocities. It is also the only way in which a depoliticized approach to documenting these
monstrous historical episodes can be achieved. Such an approach is critical to increasing
our  understanding  of  these  mass  crimes  against  a  civilian  population  that,  while
neglected in the West, has been instrumentalized in the East.
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The  mass  arson  of  villages  on  occupied  Soviet  territory  and  the  terrible  plight  of  their
inhabitants – who were executed, burnt alive or deported – has left a lasting impression on the
minds  of  East  Europeans,  whereas  the  genocide  of  Jews  in  these  same  regions  has  been
disregarded for decades. The contrast between the remembrance of Soviet Jewish and non-Jewish
victims became particularly striking in the 1960s when the new Khatyn memorial monument
near Minsk devoted to the memory of Bielorussian torched villages became a real pilgrimage site
for  most  of  the Soviet  population,  while  the Babi  Yar  ravine near  Kiev,  which had seen the
greatest  massacre  of  Soviet  Jews,  was  selected  amid  stormy  controversy  for  the  tardy
construction of a monument broadly commemorating victims of Nazi massacres in Kiev. This
article aims to show how the theme of burnt down villages pervaded official discourse from very
early on in the war and competed with the narrative of the mass killing of Soviet Jews, even
though the end of the war and the Soviets’ judicial cooperation with their Western allies in the
prosecution of war criminals prompted, both at home and abroad and over the course of several
months, a more explicit discourse about the specific plight of Soviet Jews. The accounts of Nazi
atrocities, published during the first weeks following the invasion, develop at length the theme
of  war  violence  committed  against  civilians,  a  theme  both  ancestral  and  unheard  of  by  its
magnitude. That was before the occupant moved on to the massive “dead zone” policy reported
by  Soviet  commissions  of  enquiry  through  survivors’  accounts  and  lists  with  the  names  of
victims. The trials that immediately followed the war, in Nuremberg as well as the Soviet Union,
gave the Stalinist leadership the opportunity to apply the new judicial concept of crime against
humanity to the various categories of Soviet victims of the occupation.
Résumé
La destruction par le feu de milliers de villages en territoire soviétique occupé, ainsi que le sort
atroce de leurs  habitants,  exécutés,  voire brûlés  vifs,  ou déportés  a  durablement marqué les
consciences à l’Est, alors que le génocide des juifs dans ces mêmes régions reste dans l’ombre
depuis des décennies. Ce contraste entre la mémoire des victimes juives et non-juives en Union
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soviétique  apparaît  particulièrement  frappant  à  partir  des  années  1960,  lorsque  le  nouveau
mémorial  de  Khatyn  près  de  Minsk,  consacré  à  la  mémoire  des  villages  brûlés  biélorusses,
devient un véritable lieu de pèlerinage pour l’ensemble des Soviétiques, tandis que le site du plus
grand  massacre  de  juifs  soviétiques,  le  ravin  de  Babi  Yar  à  Kiev,  malgré  de  houleuses
controverses,  voit  la  construction,  tardive,  d’un  mémorial  qui  universalise  les  victimes  des
massacres. L’objectif de cet article est de montrer comment, dès le début de la guerre, le thème
des villages brûlés est omniprésent dans le récit officiel et entre en compétition avec le compte
rendu du massacre généralisé  des juifs  soviétiques,  alors  même que la  fin de la  guerre et  la
coopération judiciaire des Soviétiques avec leurs alliés occidentaux pour juger les criminels de
guerre donnent lieu, pendant plusieurs mois, à un discours beaucoup plus explicite, sur la scène
internationale comme en territoire soviétique, concernant le sort spécifique des juifs soviétiques.
Les récits d’atrocités nazies,  publiés dès les premières semaines après l’invasion, développent
abondamment  ce  motif,  à  la  fois  ancestral  et  inédit  par  son ampleur,  de  violence de guerre
commise contre les civils,  avant même que l’occupant ne passe effectivement à une politique
massive de création de « zones mortes », ce dont les commissions d’enquête soviétiques rendent
compte à travers les témoignages de rescapés et les listes nominatives de victimes. Les procès de
l’immédiat  après-guerre,  à  Nuremberg  comme  en  Union  soviétique,  sont  l’occasion  pour  la
direction stalinienne d’appliquer le nouveau concept judiciaire de crime contre l’humanité aux
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